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Abstract. The provision of public goods and the amelioration of market failure are the classical 
justifications for government intervention in the economy. In reality, (1) governments intervene 
in markets that are not affected by failure, and (2) a large share of the government resources is 
spent in private goods, not in public goods. In contrast to issue (1), issue (2) has received little 
attention in the literature, in spite of the potentially large efficiency and equity losses arising 
from misguided allocations of public expenditures. This paper empirically documents the size of 
(2) in the rural sector and investigates its consequences for rural development for ten Latin 
American countries over the 1985–2000 period. The econometric evidence suggests that the 
structure of public expenditures is an important factor of economic development in the rural 
sector, much greater than that of the level of public expenditures and of other factors on which 
the development literature has traditionally focused.  Expanding total public expenditure in rural 
areas while maintaining the existing public expenditure composition prevailing in certain 
countries does little to promote agricultural income and reduce rural poverty. Spending a 
significant share of government resources in (non-social) subsidies causes less agriculture 
income, induces an excessive reliance of agriculture on land expansion and reduces the income 
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Why Governments Should Stop Non-Social Subsidies: Measuring Their Consequences for 
Rural Latin America  
I. Introduction 
The provision of public goods and the related issue of ameliorating the impact of market 
failure are the classical justifications for government intervention in the economy. In reality, 
governments often do not do a good job in fulfilling these roles: (1) they intervene in markets 
that cannot be even remotely considered affected by failure or imperfections, and (2) a large 
share of the financial, human, and institutional public resources is spent in private goods (non-
social subsidies), not on public goods.  
 Misguided public policies that interfere with essentially efficient markets have been for a 
long time a central concern to economists.  The literature documenting and measuring the 
efficiency costs of market interferences for many commodities and many countries around the 
world is indeed massive.
1  On the basis of these studies, international organizations as well as 
several other economic institutions have forcefully argued for the removal of government 
interference with markets for several decades.  
The high degree of attention that the economics literature has given to issue (1) contrasts 
with the relatively little concern that issue (2) has generated. This despite the potentially large 
efficiency and equity losses arising from misguided allocations of public expenditures. This 
paper empirically documents the size of (2) in the rural sector and measures its consequences for 
rural development (per capita income, agricultural land intensity, and rural poverty) for ten Latin 
American countries over the period 1985–2000 using a newly assembled data set. 
Diverting part of the government resources to spending in private goods means that 
government over-taxes the private sector, under-supplies public goods (including expenditures in 
dealing with market failures), or both.
2  Whatever the means used by the public sector to finance 
spending in private goods, efficiency losses associated with the inevitable distortions caused by 
raising more taxes than needed or by under-providing public goods are implied.  For the 
empirical part of this paper, however, we assume that the total fiscal resources (financial, human, 
                                                 
1 The book by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés (1991) constitutes a distinguished example of the great effort spent by the 
profession in documenting and criticizing government interference with otherwise efficient markets. 
2 A third possibility is instead to increase public debt. Increasing government debt may over periods of time allow 
governments to spend large volumes of revenue on private goods without decreasing expenditures in public goods, 
while still keeping the tax burden low. But the debt mechanism is available mainly over the short run.      2 
and institutional) available for the rural sector are exogenous and fixed. This allows us to 
concentrate the empirical analysis on various forms of crowding out of expenditures on public 
goods within a fixed rural budget. For the sake of keeping the issues in perspective, however, the 
remainder of this introduction and the next section will retain a broader level of generality in this 
respect.  
The under-provision of public goods may have serious negative consequences for the 
productivity of private investment, as public goods are important complementary assets with 
private capital. As we shall see below, non-social subsidies, often available only to selected 
individuals and firms, appear to contribute little to stimulate growth. Thus, the restricted supply 
of public goods (or higher taxes) necessary to finance spending in subsidies may involve a poor 
tradeoff as a policy to promote growth.  A low supply of public goods means scarcity of human 
capital,
3 underinvestment in research and development (R&D), less infrastructure, insufficient 
sanitary and environmental protection, etc. (World Bank, 2000). All these are important assets 
that contribute to increase the productivity of private investments. Hence their scarcity is likely 
to constitute an obstacle to economic expansion.  
The biased structure of public expenditure allocation may have important social equity 
implications as well. For reasons to be discussed below, government expenditures in (non-social) 
subsidies and other private goods tend to be directed toward the wealthier segments of society 
and, at the same time, have little effect in promoting employment. The only significant assets of 
the poor are their labor force and, for the rural poor, their natural resources. The income of the 
poor is thus extremely dependent on their ability to enhance their human capital and to protect 
the natural assets, both important public or semi-public goods. 
Over-taxation that spending in private goods may cause also has negative equity 
consequences. It is well known that in most developing countries the tax system is not 
progressive, especially because of its great reliance on indirect taxation and because of the 
prevalence of tax evasion.
4  So the additional taxes needed to finance subsidies to selected 
                                                 
3 Education and health care, though not pure public goods, have characteristics of public goods, especially in 
developing countries. Their positive externalities are well documented in the literature. The poor, who often 
constitute a large segment of the population in developing countries, are generally unable to finance even highly 
profitable investments in human capital due to imperfections of capital markets; so if governments do not intervene 
in some form, such investments are often not realized. 
4 “Given the low importance of personal income taxes and property taxes in Latin American countries, the direct 
distributive leverage of the tax system in most countries should be expected to be very small or even negative” 
(World Bank, 2004, p. 254). According to the World Bank, while in developed countries income taxes and property   3 
individuals and firms are to a significant degree paid by the poor. In addition, the undersupply of 
public goods affects the welfare of the poor much more than the welfare of the wealthy.  
Many empirical studies have measured the impact of specific public goods such as R&D, 
rural roads, and other infrastructure on agriculture as well as on other sectors.
5 What seems to be 
missing, however, is a broader approach that may permit evaluation of the impact of public 
goods vis-à-vis other types of government expenditures on efficiency and social equity. Without 
such a comparison, the conceptual and policy implications of findings pointing to the payoffs of 
certain specific public expenditures are in part overlooked. 
At the policy level, there seems to be a degree of consensus regarding the importance of 
an adequate provision of public goods for economic expansion and social equity. However, the 
same lack of a clear conceptual framework and the general weakness of empirical studies due in 
part to such a conceptual deficit also mean a certain weakness in the policy recommendations. It 
is clearly a rather empty policy statement to advise governments to increase expenditures on 
education, health, roads, etc., without pinpointing the source of the low expenditures on such 
goods in the first place, and without indicating what expenditures to cut (or what taxes to raise) 
in the second place.
6  
Apart from affecting the rate of agricultural growth, the heavy emphasis of governments 
on subsidizing the wealthy is likely to affect the patterns of growth of agriculture. In particular, a 
hypothesis that we test here is that (non-social) subsidies tend to make agricultural growth much 
more dependent on land expansion than on intensification.  In many countries, especially tropical 
ones, agricultural growth is linked to area expansion much more than to intensification.
7 This 
pattern of growth is often responsible for the large deforestation impacts attributed to agriculture 
by many studies (Barbier, 2004).   It has been shown that when governments are prone to 
                                                                                                                                                             
taxes constitute more than 10.5% of GDP, in Latin America they comprise only 3.7% of GDP.  Another study, by 
Chu, Davoodi, and Gupta (2000), corroborates this finding.    
5 See, for example, the survey by Alston et al. (2000) of studies documenting returns to agricultural R&D and 
extension; Psacharopoulos (1994) for returns to education; and the World Bank (2000) for an extensive review of 
studies measuring returns to various other public goods.  
6 It can also be counterproductive because it may induce governments either to increase taxes, which, given the 
weaknesses of the tax system discussed earlier, may have negative efficiency and equity effects, or worse to create 
fiscal disequilibria that could over the intermediate run become very costly and cause an even greater undersupply of 
public goods (Argentina is probably an important recent example of the latter).  
7 Graham, Gauthier, and Mendonça de Barros (1987), for example, concluded that area expansion rather than yield 
increases accounts for practically all of the growth of Brazilian agriculture between 1950 and 1980. Similar findings 
are documented by López (1997) for Ghana. 
   4 
provide non-social subsidies, expanding farm size beyond optimal levels is a rational response by 
farmers signaling their disposition to offer bribes in exchange for subsidies (Bulte, Damania, and 
López, 2004). Land expansion is thus a vehicle to promote subsidies, and knowing that 
governments are prone to subsidize induces farmers to expand land area. That is, land expansion 
and subsidies are the cause and effect of each other.  
In summary, this paper conceptually justifies and empirically tests three hypotheses: (i) 
that countries that, ceteris paribus, spend a greater share of rural public expenditures in private 
goods have lower agricultural per capita income than countries that spend more on rural public 
goods; (ii) that agriculture in these countries tends to be more dependent on the expansion of the 
land area rather than on intensification; and (iii) that rural poverty in these countries is worse.  
To test these hypotheses we use a newly assembled data set for the period 1985–2000 for 
the rural sector for several countries in Latin America. These data consist of annual rural public 
expenditures collected using a consistent methodology across countries and over time. The high 
degree of detail of these data is sufficient to allow us to aggregate rural expenditures in public 
goods and in private goods. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First we discuss general conceptual 
issues, in Section II. In Section III we present the empirical model. Section IV provides an 
overview of the data used. Section V presents the econometric results. Section VI concludes.  
II. Conceptual Issues 
  The classification of public expenditures into public goods and private goods arises from 
the conceptual view that governments’ primary responsibility is to, using use taxpayers’ money, 
supply public goods, including goods and services that are undersupplied as a consequence of 
missing markets or of market imperfections.
8 The importance of the public versus private good 
dichotomy is that while the public good tends to be complementary with private investment, the 
private good, as we shall see, tends to be a substitute for private investment.  
 Political motivation and the structure of public expenditures. The political motivation of 
the government to invest in public goods is fundamentally different than its motivation to do so 
in private goods, and such different motivations cause important socio-economic effects of the 
public/private good choice.  By definition the benefits of public or semi-public goods tend to 
                                                 
8  In practice, as we shall see, the distinction between public and private goods is not sharp. But by and large, more 
often than not, a reasonable separation between these goods is possible.   5 
disperse much more among the population than those of private goods. This implies that the 
political lobby targets private goods that wholly benefit particular lobby groups much more than 
they target public goods, of which the lobby group shares only a fraction of the benefits. The 
struggle by lobby groups to elicit subsidies from the government is often their prime motivation. 
It is well known that successful lobbies are typically constituted by small groups with a clear 
common interest and objectives (Olson, 1965). In addition, and most important, successful lobby 
groups often have enough financial means to bribe politicians and to contribute to their political 
campaigns, or they have enough social status to be able to affect public opinion through a variety 
of means.
9 
These requirements for constituting a successful lobby are often satisfied by economic 
elites and rarely by the poor.
10 The implication is by now a stylized fact: Government 
expenditures in private goods go almost always to the wealthy and only very rarely to the poor.
11 
This is in sharp contrast with expenditures in public goods, which generally produce benefits that 
tend to disperse across all groups in society, poor and non-poor alike.  The social equity effects 
of the composition of public expenditures are obvious: The greater the share of government 
expenditures in private goods, the worse, ceteris paribus, is income distribution and poverty. 
Because the structure of public expenditures tends to be more biased towards private goods when 
the economic power of the elites is in the first place already greater, such biased composition of 
public expenditures may be both cause and effect of poverty and social inequity.   
  The structure of public expenditures and economic efficiency.  The public/private good 
dichotomy is grounded on another factor which has to do more directly with economic efficiency 
than with equity.  Investment in public goods provides factors of production that are almost by 
definition rarely supplied by the private sector. For this reason one can reasonably expect that 
such investment will fill a vacuum that is not fulfilled by the private sector. As a consequence, a 
complementary relationship between private investments and public goods is likely to arise. 
                                                 
9 Deacon (2002), among others, has empirically shown that less democratic governments (and in general those that 
give less opportunity to their citizenry to participate in decision making and that are therefore  prone to lobby 
pressures from the wealthy) tend to provide a lower share of public expenditures on public goods, instead placing 
more emphasis on non-social subsidies. 
10 Sometimes organized workers, who are often not part of the wealthier segments of society, are able to also 
become powerful lobbies.  However, the successful workers’ lobbies rarely encompass the poor. Recently certain 
groups among the poor (some indigenous groups, grass-root organizations, etc.) have been able to become part of 
the lobby forces, but their capacity to effectively lobby governments tends to be limited by disadvantages in terms of 
group size, education, and other shortcomings.  
11 For an empirical illustration of this phenomenon see Calmon (2004) with dramatic evidence for Brazil.     6 
Government expenditures in private goods (non-social subsidies), by contrast, often finance 
assets that could equally well be financed directly by private entrepreneurs.  Even more 
important, as argued above these government subsidies go to the wealthy, who already face 
generally no constraints to invest at optimal levels (who are likely to face no liquidity constraints 
or other types of market imperfections).  As shown below, the effect of these subsidies is almost 
always detrimental for economic efficiency and, far from contributing to promote private 
investment, the subsidies tend to crowd it out and to increase the consumption of the wealthy 
instead.
12   
Thus, we have another important contrast that justifies the emphasis on the public/private 
goods dichotomy: While increasing public goods is likely to promote economic growth directly 
(as factors of production) and indirectly (through its positive effect on private investment), 
increasing subsidies is more often than not deleterious for growth and private investment.  
Crowding-out and agricultural performance.  Government provision of private goods or 
subsidies causes three forms of crowding-out with negative efficiency and equity effects: 
   (i) Subsidies crowd out the supply of public goods through the government budget, 
human, and institutional constraints. The budget crowding-out is obvious: government-provided 
subsidies compete with the provision of public goods, not only for government’s financial 
resources but also for other public resources that also tend to be scarce. The administration of 
subsidy programs often absorbs a large share of the limited availability of the government’s 
human capital. Scarce institutional capital is also usually preferentially allocated to subsidy 
programs.  
Governments forego investments in public goods that, according to many studies, have 
extremely large rates of return.  The survey by Alston et al. (2000), for example, reviews 
hundreds of studies around the world estimating rates of return to agriculture R&D revealing 
extremely high and non-declining rates. Psacharopoulos’s (1994) survey does the same for 
studies measuring returns to education over many countries, also showing very high rates. Also, 
a study by Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (2000) found unusually high returns to a variety of public 
infrastructure investment in agriculture in India and China. The World Bank (2000) has gathered 
evidence also pointing to very high rates of return to certain investments in protecting the 
                                                 
12 Subsidies may, however, be directed in some cases to mitigate market imperfections and externalities that 
otherwise may prevent even wealthy entrepreneurs from optimally investing.  The evidence available, however, 
seems to indicate that subsidies that can be justified in this way are rarely implemented.   7 
environment. Thus the persistence of such unusually large rates of return suggests that under-
investment in public goods is likely to have large negative effects on per capita income.  This 
conclusion is reinforced by further empirical evidence showing that subsidies have low or even 
negative economic rates of return and that they crowd out private investment. We turn to these 
issues next.     
(ii) Subsidies may directly crowd out private investments.  Consider what is often 
regarded as a “desirable” subsidy: the government offers to pay a portion of the cost for a 
particular investment.
13 The subsidy is of course rationed as the funds are normally less than the 
demand. Assume for simplicity that their allocation among producers is transparent, not subject 
to corruption.  Consider an investor who is able to extract a profitable return out of an investment 
(even in the absence of the subsidy) who potentially may qualify for the subsidy but who does 
not obtain the subsidy.  The producer may go ahead with the investment (without getting the 
subsidy) anyway, since it is a profitable one. Alternatively, she/he may opt to postpone the 
investment and to try again the following year in the hope of then getting the subsidy.  If the 
expected value of the subsidy is sufficiently large to compensate the foregone profits of one year, 
the producer may decide to delay the investment.
14 Thus, investments that are privately (and 
socially) profitable may be postponed as a consequence of the existence of the subsidy. 
Among the investors who actually get the subsidy there are two types: those who would 
have implemented the investment anyway and those who otherwise would not have (because 
they would not be able to get high enough returns). For the former the subsidy is ineffective. For 
the latter the subsidy is effective insofar as it causes them to invest, but, in the absence of 
positive externalities associated with the investment, they do so at a low social return. Thus, the 
subsidy scheme does two things: (i) it increases consumption rather than investment by 
producers who are able to obtain the subsidy but who would have invested anyway, and (ii) it 
reallocates investment from those producers who potentially could have gotten high rates of 
return but who did not obtain the subsidy (and who decide to postpone the investment, expecting 
                                                 
13 This example is based on an actual irrigation-drainage public subsidy scheme for “small” projects (subsidy 
amount up to US$275,000 per producer) in Chile that cost the government about US$30 million per year, using 
parameters obtained from the program. 
14 Suppose the subsidy is 50% (the Chilean subsidy pays between 25% and 75% of the total investment) of the value 
of the investment cost and that the rate of return per annum of the investment is quite high, 20%. Assume further 
that the producer estimates that the probability of getting the subsidy the following year is 0.5 (in the Chile example, 
about 45% of the proposals are funded). If the producer is risk-neutral, he/she will decide to delay the investment for 
one year.    8 
to get the subsidy in the future) to producers who obtain a low social return but invest only 
because they are able to access the subsidy. The net effect on total investment is ambiguous, but 
the efficiency impact is negative as a consequence of effect (ii).  
The above example is not just a curiosity. That subsidies, at least in the form in which 
they are usually allocated, do not generally promote investment has been shown by several 
empirical studies in various countries. Empirical studies using detailed firm-level data by 
Bregman, Fuss, and Regev (1999) for Israel, Fakin (1995) for Poland, Lee (1996) for Korea, 
Bergstrom (1998) for Sweden, Estache and Gaspar (1995) for Brazil, Harris (1991) for Ireland, 
and several others have shown that subsidies and corporate tax concessions targeted to specific 
firms are at best ineffective in promoting investment and technological adoption and, in some 
instances, even counterproductive.  Crowding-out of private investment as a consequence of the 
subsidies occurs.  
(iii) Subsidies may indirectly crowd out private investment in the intermediate run.  The 
third type of crowding-out of private investment as a result of public expenditure biases toward 
subsidies is long-run in nature. The low stocks of public goods caused by continuous under-
investment in public goods causes low productivity of private investments over the long run. 
This, in turn, is translated into slower investment and slower productivity growth over the long 
run (World Bank. 2000).  
The structure of public expenditure and rural poverty.  Public goods affect rural poverty 
through direct effects and through indirect effects:  
(i) Direct effects. Important components of rural public goods are human capital and investment 
in the protection of natural resources and the environment. Human capital is the main productive 
asset for most poor. However, as a consequence of credit and other market failures they are not 
in general able to fully finance investments in human capital, regardless of how high the rate of 
return to these investments might be (World Bank, 2000). They are, therefore, largely dependent 
on the public sector as a source of financing for these investments.   On the other hand, the rural 
poor are also highly dependent on natural resources as a source of subsistence (Barbier, 2004). 
The price of resource degradation is often disproportionately paid by the rural poor. Increasing 
investment to protect natural resources and to mitigate environmental externalities is, therefore, 
vital to reducing rural poverty.    9 
(ii) Indirect effects. As discussed earlier, an adequate stock of rural public goods contributes to 
sustain growth for agriculture and related rural industries. In general much of the rural industry 
linked to agriculture is highly intensive in unskilled labor (Lanjouw and lanjouw, 1995). 
Moreover, it appears that the rural sector in many developing countries is important enough 
within the broader unskilled labor market to significantly affect the real wages for unskilled 
workers even at a national level. Thus a dynamic rural productive sector is a vital source of 
employment for unskilled workers as it may play a role in supporting higher real wages. To the 
extent that most poor are unskilled workers, these effects may be important in reducing poverty. 
III. The Model 
  The agriculture per capita value-added function. The approach is to specify a reduced-
form model that explains agricultural GDP per capita as a function of variables that are 
exogenous to agriculture as well as of policy variables. We start with specifying a production 
function, 
 (1)             ) ; , , ( A X K L F Q = ,      
where Q is agriculture output, L is labor used in the sector, K is a vector of primary factors of 
production owned by farmers, X is a vector of purchased inputs, and A is a productivity index. 
We assume that F( ) is concave in K, L, and X, and that it is subject to constant returns to scale; 
that is, F( ) is homogenous of degree one in L, K, and X.
15 
Agriculture value added or GDP is defined as the returns to primary factors, K and L. 
Thus,  
(2)                   } ) ; , , ( max{ ) ; , ; , ( vX A X K L pF A L K v p G
X
- ” , 
where G( ) is agriculture GDP, p is output price, and v is a vector of purchased input prices. The 
function G( ) is a (dual) revenue or value added function and must satisfy certain conditions.  
The most important, from our point of view, is that, apart from being increasing and concave in 
L and K, the agricultural value added function is also homogenous of degree one in K and L. 
This follows directly from the constant returns to scale assumption. We can thus express per 
capita agriculture GDP as  
                                                 
15 The assumption of constant returns to scale in agriculture has not often been rejected by empirical studies using 
farm household data. See, for example, López and Valdés (2000), who provide estimates for five countries in Latin 
America.   10 
(3)                      
L
A L K v p G
A k v p g
) ; , ; , (
) ; ; , (
_
” . 
Per capita GDP is a function of output and purchased input prices, and the per capita values of 
the farmer’s owned assets, k, as well as of the productivity factor, A. It is increasing in p, k, and 
A, and decreasing in v. The remainder of this section is devoted to the estimation strategy of the 
per capita agricultural GDP function,  ) ; ; , (
_
A k v p g .   
  We postulate that output and purchased input prices are determined by world prices, 
domestic government policies (including trade policy, subsidies, etc.), and the performance of 
the non-agriculture economy, which may also play a role in affecting prices of non-traded 
commodities.  That is, 
(4)                         ) , , (
* Y H p p f = ;    ) , , (
* Y H v v y = ,  
where a star indicates world prices, H stands for a vector of government policies affecting 
domestic prices, and Y reflects conditions in sectors other than agriculture but ones that could 
affect prices relevant to agriculture. The variables
* p , H, and Y are all subject to change over 
time as world market conditions, policies, and non-agricultural growth conditions vary.   
  The variable A is also endogenous and affected by variables exogenous to the farmer, 
including domestic market prices and government policies,   
(5)                                  ) , , ( v p H A A= . 
The level of A is postulated to be affected primarily by government policies, particularly public 
expenditures in public goods such as R&D, extension, and education. It can also be affected by 
other market conditions that affect the profitability of adopting new technologies, represented by 
p and v, as well as by k.  Similarly, the conditions of the non-agriculture economy play a role on 
agriculture through the market effects associated with demand conditions for the commodities 
and inputs relevant to agriculture.  
Combining (4) and (5) we obtain a reduced-form function for A, 
(6)                               ) , , , ( Y H v p A
* * =y . 
We can disaggregate the vector H into T (trade policies), E (per capita total government 
expenditures in the sector), and S (the share of government subsidies in the total expenditures in 
the sector). We note that S includes both the direct non-social transfers as well as subsidies that   11 
take place via markets that demand government outlays (credit subsidies, deficiency payments, 
stabilization payments, etc.).  Thus, we can write 
(7)                                 ) , , , , , (
* * Y S E T v p A y = . 
We expect that A is non-decreasing in
*, , and  pEY  and decreasing in
* v . The effect of S on A 
is, according to our previous discussion, non-positive. The variable T is defined as an index of 
trade openness. We expect that in countries that have used trade protection to discriminate 
against agriculture, as have most countries in Latin America, the effect of T on A is non-
negative.     
  Using (4), (5), and (7) in (3), we have now a specification for a reduced form for the per 
capita agricultural GDP function, 
(8)                   ) ; , , , , , (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
* *
) ( + + - + + - +
= k Y S E T v p g g . 
The signs underneath the variables indicate the expected effects of the various exogenous 
variables on the reduced-form per capita GDP. The sign pattern in (8) follows straightforwardly 
from the sign pattern of the structural GDP function, 
_
g (  ), and from the signs of the effects of 
the exogenous variables on k and A pointed out earlier.  Equation (8) is the basis for the 
specification of the estimating model of per capita agricultural GDP. 
  Econometric estimation of the per capita GDP function. Consider the following 
benchmark econometric specification: 
(9)                    it t i it it it it it it k Y L T L S L E L g e w m a a a a a + + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ , 
where it g is the log of per capita agricultural GDP in country i at year t, L are lag operators, and  
            it E  is total government-provided services to rural areas in country i and year t 
            it S  is the share of subsidies or private goods in  it E  
            it T is an index of trade policy openness in country i at time t 
             it Y  is a measure of per capita non-agricultural GDP in country i at t 
             i m  is either a fixed country effect or, alternatively, a random country disturbance 
             t w  is a common time effect 
            it e  is a random, independently distributed disturbance with mean 0 and variance
2 s .    12 
We alternatively allow for a dynamic model where the lagged dependent variable is 
included as an additional explanatory variable ) ( 1 - it g in (9). As we discuss below, this requires a 
more complex method of estimation to obtain consistent estimates with limited sample size 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991).
16  Moreover, this generalization of the model does involve tradeoffs 
in terms of the efficiency of the estimates (more on this below).  We estimate agricultural GDP 
per hectare using the same right-hand-side variables as in (9). Alternatively, we use agricultural 
GDP per hectare instead of agricultural per capita GDP as the dependent variable. In this case the 
variable  ij E is normalized by agricultural land area instead of rural population.  
Several important additional comments about (9) are in order: 
(i) World prices. It is difficult to construct an appropriate price index for each country. As a 
proxy we use annual dummies ( t w ) that are supposed to capture international shocks, including 
world price changes that may affect the countries in the sample. 
(ii) Unobserved country characteristics. There are many country-specific factors such as climate, 
land quality, institutions, etc., that may affect GDP but that we do not explicitly control for. 
These omitted variables may bias the coefficient estimated if they correlate with the explanatory 
variables, or at least affect the efficiency of the estimation. The role of  i m  is to control for such 
omitted variables as country-fixed effects or, alternatively, as random effects.  
(iii) Government expenditures. While the vast majority of the government expenditures are 
current expenditures, a portion of them are investments that accumulate over time as capital 
goods. To control for this we experimented allowing both current and lagged values of E to 
influence current GDP levels. The same approach was used for the variable S.    
(iv) Simultaneous equation biases.  Public expenditures in agriculture may be affected by the 
performance of agriculture. This potentially causes simultaneity biases in the estimated 
coefficient of E and S. We thus use lagged values of E and S as instruments when we estimate 
the regressions with the annual data. Similarly, the relationship between agriculture and non-
agriculture income is likely to be simultaneous rather than unidirectional. This may potentially 
bias the estimates of the effect of Y in (9). To diminish the risk of such biases we use instruments 
in such a way that predicted rather than actual values of Y are used in estimating (9). In the 
                                                 
16 In this case a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation is used.  This means that the lag operators are no 
longer needed as the GMM approach uses the lag values of the variables as instruments in a systematic way.     13 
dynamic model, the GMM allows for a more comprehensive and systematic use of instruments 
(Greene, 2003).  
(v) Agricultural primary factors. The vector k should in principle include per capita agricultural 
capital and agricultural land area. However, though for an individual farmer the land area may be 
part of his/her optimizing behavior, for the economy as a whole it may in the short run be fixed 
and in the long run greatly affected by government policy.  Expanding the agricultural land area, 
especially in countries with remaining frontier areas, can be considered to be at least in part a 
government-controlled policy.  If we assume that it is fully an endogenous variable there would 
be no reason to explicitly include it in the reduced-form specification (9). If, however, land is in 
part exogenous to the sector, then one needs to use it as an additional explanatory variable. We 
thus estimate two versions of (9): One that includes land area (through instruments to allow for 
its possibly endogenous component) as an additional explanatory variable, and another that does 
not.  With respect to the other primary factor, we do not have data for agricultural capital, so we 
are forced to use the remaining explanatory variables in the reduced-form (9) as proxies. It may 
not be unreasonable to assume that agricultural capital is correlated with these variables, which 
may affect the profitability of capital in an important way. The interpretation of the coefficients 
of the other explanatory variables is, therefore, that they encompass the full effect of such 
variables, including the effects through k.
17  
  Estimating the determinants of agricultural land area.   It follows quite naturally from 
the previous discussion that we can postulate the following relationship, 
it i it it it it it Y L T L S L E L land J h g g g g + + + + + = ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 4 3 2 1 , 
where  i h   is a random or, alternatively, fixed effect, and  it J  is a random disturbance with the 
usual desirable distribution properties.  
  Estimating rural poverty.  It is postulated that rural poverty is affected by government 
policies and other exogenous factors through direct and indirect channels. Government 
expenditures in rural areas are likely to affect rural poverty directly through social expenditures 
that target the poor. In addition, government expenditures in rural infrastructure provide 
employment to part of the rural poor, thus contributing to reduce poverty. Trade policy may also 
have direct poverty effects by affecting domestic prices of food necessities and other 
                                                 
17 That is, we assume that ) , , , , , ( Y S E T v p k
* * W = , where W is a real value function.   14 
commodities important to the poor. Also it may affect the incentives to production of 
commodities mostly produced by the poor vis-à-vis those produced by the non-poor. These 
policies also indirectly affect the rural poor if they have an impact on the performance of the 
agricultural sector. Finally, the rural poor may also be affected by the non-rural sectors of the 
economy through migration and remittances, and by affecting real wages in the rural areas.   
  We estimate variants of the following poverty equation, 
(10)              it i it it it it it it T L S L E L Y L g L pov t x b b b b b + + + + + + = ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 5 4 3 2 1 , 
where  i x  is a random country effect and  it t is a random disturbance. We expect the effects of g, 
E, and Y on poverty to be non-positive while the impact of T to be ambiguous and, according to 
the discussion in the previous section, the effect of S to be positive. As in the case of the GDP 
equation, we tried various lag structures to capture for cumulative effects of the explanatory 
variable E over time as well as other instruments.  The most popular measure of poverty is the 
head count ratio. However, head count measures may be quite heterogeneous as the definition of 
poverty lines tends to differ quite considerably across countries and over time. We use per capita 
income of the poorest two quintiles as a proxy for the variable it pov .  
IV. The Data   
  In this section we examine a new data set for rural public expenditures for ten countries 
in Latin America recently assembled by the FAO regional office for Latin America and the 
Caribbean with the support of the World Bank and others. The annual data for the ten countries 
cover the period 1985–2000.
18  An advantage of this data is that it is quite disaggregated while at 
the same time it has been measured using a reasonably consistent methodology across countries 
and over time. In addition the public expenditure data as provided is comprehensive, covering 
the vast majority of the items in which the public sector spends money in the rural areas.  The 
level of detail of the data allows us to obtain a fairly accurate measure of the evolution of the 
level and composition of government expenditures in rural areas over the period.    
  The data for public expenditures in the rural sector cover all rural expenditures, including 
expenditures for agriculture as well as rural infrastructure, animal and plant sanitary protection, 
environmental expenditures, and social services to rural areas. The latter group covers 
                                                 
18 The countries for which the data covers the full period are Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For a detailed description of the data see Kerrigan 
(2001).   15 
expenditures in rural education, health, and other social sectors. All in all, rural public 
expenditures are disaggregated into 12 categories. The expenditure groups (including in brackets 
their respective average country share in total public expenditures for the year 1995) are the 
following: marketing assistance (28), irrigation (7.7), technological generation and transfers 
(4.7), soil conservation (1.2), forest promotion (0.09), plant and animal sanitation (4.2), 
communications and information (1.6), “focalized” expenditures directed to particular 
commodities (4.9), integral rural development (IRD) (4.1), rural public infrastructure (16.3), 
rural education, health, and other social services (25.5), and others (1.7).  
To allocate the above expenditures into private versus public goods we first account for 
items that clearly fall into one or the other category. Next we deal with those categories that fall 
into a gray area where it is difficult to determine a priori whether they correspond to public or 
private goods. In these cases we have looked into more detailed components falling into these 
categories in the various country statistics available. This allowed us to obtain an educated guess 
as to what proportion of these expenditure items should be approximately allocated to public or 
private goods. Finally there are some minor items for which we were not even able to have a 
reasonable guess. In the latter cases we simply use a 50-50 rule. 
 Among the items that clearly qualify as public goods are technology generation and 
transfers, soil conservation, plant and animal sanitary protection, communications and 
information services, rural roads, and social services (public education, health, and anti-poverty 
programs). The above expenditures were classified as public goods, because they increase the 
supply of services that generate important positive externalities (technology generation and 
diffusion, soil conservation, plant and animal sanitation), were expenditures directed to at least in 
part palliate the impact of poverty (public education, health, and social programs), which can be 
regarded as a public “bad”, and expenditures such as communication infrastructure and public 
roads that may roughly satisfy both criteria for pure public goods (non-excludability and non-
rivalry).  
  Items that were considered private goods are commodity-specific or focalized 
expenditures, marketing promotion (excluding expenditures in communications and market 
information that are among the public goods items), and irrigation expenditures. An important 
portion of “market promotion” includes direct subsidies and credit subsidies to mostly well-off 
producers.  Similarly, most of the irrigation services are completely or almost completely   16 
subsidized and benefit non-poor farmers.
19  The third group (the gray group) includes the 
categories of forest promotion, IRD programs, and “others”.  Among these items, a high 
proportion of the forest promotion expenditures were in the end allocated to public goods while a 
smaller fraction of IRD were considered to qualify as public goods.  An important portion of tree 
planting expenditures is allocated to eroded areas, thus inducing positive externalities by 
protecting soils, contributing to the regulation of water regimes, etc. IRD expenditures are mostly 
subsidies to promote particular patterns of agricultural expansion that the planners desire. As 
such, a high portion of them do not qualify as public goods.
20 
 Table 1 provides an overview of the total public expenditures in rural areas and its public 
good/private good distribution for the ten countries studied using average annual values for the 
1985–2000 period. On average, more than 54 % of the total government expenditures in rural 
areas were spent in private goods, while only 45% was spent in public goods. The average 
country in the sample spent about US$214 million (2000 dollars) per annum in the rural sector, 
of which only $96 million corresponded to public goods and $116 million to private goods. This 
large allocation of public monies to private goods may suggest a significant degree of waste. At 
the same time it provides an indication of the importance of analyzing the impact of such an 
unbalanced allocation of public resources especially on economic performance and social equity. 
Even using a much weaker criterion for defining public good items (i.e., classifying all gray area 
expenditures as public goods and also allocating 50% of irrigation expenditures to such 
category), the average share of subsidies for the sample would still be a high value, about 48%. 
Total rural expenditures showed some real increases in several countries over time, 
especially in the period 1995–2000, a period in which they increased an average of almost 20% 
per country (from $177 to $215 million per country per year). But there is a dramatic variability 
across countries in this respect. The structure of government expenditures changed quite 
                                                 
19 One may argue that classifying irrigation expenditures as private goods while other public infrastructure such as 
roads, bridges, etc., as public goods may appear as arbitrary. However, unlike other forms of public infrastructure, 
irrigation projects are targeted to a limited number of farmers (who usually pay little if at all for the water service), 
excluding everyone else from directly benefiting from the irrigation investment. In addition, irrigation water 
generally does not satisfy the indivisibility criterion of a public good; a farmer’s consumption of irrigation water 
directly diminishes the availability for other farmers of using it. The only remaining question is whether or not the 
government irrigation investment helps to solve a market failure, which in general is not the case except for rare 
situations where the irrigation project serves poor farmers who may be affected by credit market failure.      
20 As reported in the next section, given the inevitable divergent views about the classification of some items into 
one or the other category, we did perform some limited sensitivity analysis to check for the robustness of the results 
to the classification criteria.    17 
significantly over the period. The average per country share of subsidies in total expenditures 
substantially declined, particularly over the last five years of the period. The average share of 
subsidies steadily fell from 60% in 1985-90 to 58% in 1990-94, and to 44% in 1995–2000.  
Moreover, in practically all countries the proportion of subsidies in total government 
expenditures decreased or remained stable, the exceptions being Ecuador and Paraguay. The 
structure of public expenditures, not surprisingly, varies a lot across countries. Moreover it also 
exhibits a meaningful and large variability within countries over time. These large and seemingly 
meaningful variances are extremely important features which allow us to appropriately use panel 
data econometrics, including fixed effects methods (Nerlove, 2002).  
Turning to the remaining variables used, the indicator of trade openness is intended to 
measure the degree of openness of trade policy rather than trade volumes.  Large countries 
(population and area wise) inherently tend to trade less than small countries, as they are naturally 
more self-sufficient, regardless of trade policy. If we want to use trade (imports plus exports) 
over GDP as a proxy for trade policy we must, therefore, normalize for country size and other 
structural characteristics (access to sea ports, oil wealth, etc.) that may affect the natural 
tendency of countries to trade. We normalize trade flows following a methodology used by 
Pritchett (1996), which consists in controlling for countries’ geographic size, population, per 
capita income and other non-policy variables that are likely to affect the volume of trade.  The 
index can be interpreted as an indicator of a country’s trade policy openness with respect to the 
norm.
21  
The data of agricultural land area per country over time is obtained from FAO sources, 
and the per capita non-rural income is estimated from national account data. Finally, since no 
data for agricultural labor exist, we use the total rural labor force as a proxy for L. Summary 
statistics for all the data used are provided in the appendix.  
V. The Results 
We estimate the reduced-form for per capita agricultural GDP using various methods of 
estimations and aggregating the data in several alternative ways. Our interest is primarily in 
probing the robustness of the estimated coefficients. We present estimates using three 
specifications: (1) regressions using country data aggregated for relatively long periods of time 
                                                 
21  The actual cross-country regressions used to estimate the norm included more than 120 countries. Details about 
the methodology used are available from the author.     18 
(“long-run” estimates); (2) static estimates obtained using annual data with various specifications 
for the lag operators; and (3) dynamic estimates, also using annual data. 
“Long-run” estimates.  An attractive feature of (1) is that it is consistent with the fact that 
much of the effects of the independent variables upon per capita agriculture GDP are likely to be 
embodied through processes that may take considerably more than one year to have an effect. 
Working with several year averages instead of annual data might help in elucidating what can be 
considered long-run effects. A drawback of the approach is that one loses degrees of freedom by 
reducing the number of observations.  Alternatively, we used 3 or 5 year simple averages.
22 In 
general the absolute values of the coefficients tend to be higher when 5-year averages are used, 
but their signs and degree of significance change very little.   
Table 2 provides the Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) estimators of the per 
capita agricultural GDP regressions using 5-year simple averages as units of observation. The 
most important message emerging from all these estimates (as well as from the several 
alternative specifications used that we do not report here) is that while government expenditures 
have a positive and highly significant effect on agriculture per capita income, the structure or 
composition of such expenditures is quantitatively much more important and also of great 
statistical significance.  In fact, the results show that increasing the share of (non-social) 
subsidies keeping the total public expenditures constant has a large negative impact on 
agricultural per capita GDP.  According to the estimates, a reallocation of just 10% of the 
subsidy expenditures to supplying public goods instead may cause an increase in per capita 
agriculture income of about 2.3%.  And this is obtained without increasing the total government 
expenditures.
23 By contrast, increasing government expenditures without altering their 
composition is much less effective in raising per capita agriculture incomes: A 10% expansion of 
government outlays causes on average only a 0.6% increase of agriculture income.  
In 1996–2000, the 50% of the countries spending the least in rural areas spent about $35 
per capita, while the 50% spending the most spent about $74 per capita. Thus, if the average 
country in the bottom half increased its per capita outlays to levels comparable to the average 
country in the top half, per capita agricultural GDP in that country could increase by more than 
                                                 
22 We also use moving averages.  
23 It is important to emphasize that this result is purely a composition effect under the assumption that the efficiency 
in use of resources in public goods (which several analysts have judged to be low) remains unchanged. Of course if 
the efficiency of public good programs increases, the change in the composition of public expenditures would have 
an even greater impact.   19 
3%. With respect to the share of subsidies, in 1996–2000 it ranged from approximately 30% on 
average for the bottom half of the countries to 65% for the top half. This means that if an average 
country in the top half could readjust its public expenditure share to the level of the average 
country in the bottom half, its per capita agricultural GDP might increase, ceteris paribus, by 
12.5%.      
The results confirm the positive role of trade liberalization on agriculture income. This 
reflects the fact that agriculture is still discriminated against through protective trade policies. An 
opening up of trade policies consequently is not only good for overall economic efficiency but 
also for agriculture income. The marginal effect of the trade openness index on agricultural per 
capita income is about 0.002 and statistically significant. Moreover, this estimate is remarkably 
stable and robust to changes of specification. To get an idea of the meaning of this number it is 
useful to indicate that the trade openness index for the period for the most open country within 
the sample (Costa Rica) is about 60 points higher than that of the country that is least open 
(Uruguay). This means that if Uruguay had been as open as Costa Rica over the period, its per 
capita agricultural income would have been about 0.12 % higher. Thus, though the effect of trade 
openness is highly significant, its quantitative value is quite small, a result that is consistent with 
other studies showing that the static gains of trade liberalization may not be too great. 
The estimates show an important positive effect of the rest of the economy upon 
agriculture. This large effect may, however, be affected by biases due to omitted variables that 
could exert similar effects upon agricultural and non-agricultural GDP. The FE estimators do 
control for the impact of fixed omitted variables that are country-specific, but not for shocks that 
happen over time and that could influence the dependent variable and be correlated with the 
explanatory variable. We have also used instruments that could at least deal with reverse 
causality biases, but certainly the issue of time-varying omitted variables remains.
24 In any case, 
it appears that the performance of the non-agricultural sector also positively affects agriculture, 
as hypothesized by Gardner (2003), for example.  A final important feature about the FE and RE 
estimates is their mutual consistency. The method of estimation selected makes little difference 
in the sign, statistical significance, and even the size of the coefficients.   
                                                 
24 In the annual estimates reported below we do control for time-varying shocks that have similar effects across 
countries. As will be seen, this reduces the value of the coefficient, but the effect remains statistically significant.    20 
“Short-run” estimates: The static model.  Table 3 presents estimates of agricultural per 
capita GDP using annual data using RE and FE with robust standard errors.  We tried various lag 
structures for the explanatory variables.  The results are robust to the method of estimation and to 
other changes in specification. The sign pattern of the coefficients does not change, though their 
sizes and standard errors are mildly affected by the actual lags used.  We present in Table 3 the 
estimates using one-year lags for the explanatory variables.  
 The fact that now we have many more observations allows us to use annual time dummy 
variables in the regressions. The time dummies control for unobserved common-to-the-countries 
shocks that vary over time.
25  The pattern of significance of the estimated coefficients and their 
signs are highly consistent with the “long-run” estimates reported earlier. Consistent with the 
short-run/long-run interpretation, in general the elasticity estimates using annual data have lower 
absolute values than the coefficients estimated using the five-year averages. 
 In particular, the effects of total government expenditures in rural areas are still positive 
and statistically significant, but their values are about 50% lower than the values estimated using 
five-year averages. Similarly, the share of government subsidies in total expenditures is now 
negative and significant, as before, but the estimates are smaller in absolute value.  Still, the 
message is the same: total government expenditures are important in promoting agricultural 
income, but the structure of public expenditures is even more important. Switching resources 
from subsidies to public goods can be an extraordinarily effective instrument to achieve faster 
agricultural growth. 
The reduction of the size of the effect of the non-agriculture income is even more 
pronounced than that of the public expenditures variables. In fact, the effect of non-agriculture 
GDP falls by about 66% when annual data is used compared to five-year averages, though the 
coefficient is still significant. This drastic reduction in the size of this coefficient may reflect not 
only the short-run/long-run dichotomy, but also a possible reduction of the size of the omitted 
variable biases caused by the fact that we now partially control for effects of omitted variables 
that do change over time. In any case, an elasticity of about 0.13 still reflects a sizable positive 
impact of the rest of the economy upon agriculture. 
                                                 
25 Both the two-way FE and RE estimates passed the White’s test of heteroscedasticity at the 5% level of statistical 
significance.   21 
The Dynamic Estimates. Table 4 presents the Arellano-Bond one-step procedure GMM 
(heteroskedastic consistent) estimates of the per capita agricultural GDP function.  Although the 
GMM procedure has the advantage over the static estimates of accounting for the inertia that is 
likely to exist in the determination of agricultural GDP and in mitigating potential endogeneity 
biases of the explanatory variables, it also has some disadvantages. In particular, the Arellano-
Bond estimates tend to have low efficiency and, while first-order autocorrelation is expected, if 
second-order autocorrelation exists it may lead to inconsistent estimates.  
The estimates in Table 4 suggest that per capita agricultural GDP adjusts relatively fast, 
taking about two years to complete the adjustment to changing exogenous variables. The 
estimates concerning the level and composition of government expenditures are highly consistent 
with the static ones presented earlier. The sign pattern and significance and the relative 
magnitudes of the total public expenditures vis-à-vis the share of expenditures in subsidies is the 
same as in the static estimators. A problem with the GMM estimates in Table 4 is that they fail to 
pass the second-order autocorrelation test. This of course may lead to inconsistent estimators.  
When we normalize the variables by land area, however, the resulting estimates are free 
from second-order autocorrelation. These estimates are shown in Table 5, where for comparison 
purposes we also include the land normalized RE and FE static estimators as well. We now 
cannot reject the hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation, even at low significance levels. 
Moreover, the Sargan test for the validity of the instruments (a test of the hypothesis that the 
instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the residuals) is passed, meaning that the 
instruments are acceptable.             
The implicit long-run elasticities (that is, the steady state effects) are obtained assuming 
that per capita agricultural GDP does not change over time. Given that the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable coefficient is about 0.52, the implicit long-run elasticity of total 
government expenditures is about 0.097 (0.047/(1-0.52)), while the absolute value of the 
elasticity of the share of expenditures in non-social subsidies is almost three times bigger, equal 
to -0.26. These long-run estimates obtained using the Arellano-Bond dynamic approach are 
similar to the corresponding long-run estimates obtained using 5-year averages  static random 
effects method, which were 0.055 and -0.228 (reported in Table 2). This high degree of   22 
consistency among estimates obtained using very different approaches suggests that the 
estimates are robust.
26      
Rural poverty.  The quantitative analysis of the impact of the level and structure of public 
expenditures on rural poverty is hampered by insufficient availability of rural poverty estimates 
for the countries considered and especially by issues of data quality and comparability. The 
definition of the poverty line especially among countries and also over time varies a lot. This 
may increase the “noise” affecting head count poverty measures.  In addition, there are only two 
or at most three observations by country, a fact that considerably limits the scope of the 
econometric analysis. To increase the number of observations we were able to include three new 
countries–Guatemala, Colombia, and Nicaragua–for which we were able to obtain two poverty 
observations each, but restricted to the latter 6 or 7 years of the period, and for which measures 
over the same part of the period were available for the other variables (although we missed 
Uruguay from the old sample due to lack of rural poverty measures).  
 The use of per capita income of the poor instead of poverty rate in part deals with the 
problem associated with a lack of definition of a consistent poverty line. In fact the estimates 
appear much more precise when we use per capita income of the poor instead of poverty rate as 
the dependent variable.
27    Table 6 shows the estimates of the determinants of per capita income 
of the poorest 40% of the rural population for the period 1990–2002, which is the period for 
which such income is measured.  The data on income of the poor is not annual, but rather 
consists of no more than three observations per country for different years during the period 
1990–2002. We estimate the income of the poor function using average lagged values of the 
explanatory variables over the previous 4 years of the observation.
28 This is supposed to capture 
the delayed effect of the explanatory variables on the per capita income of the poor.   
The main finding in Table 6 is that both the level of rural public expenditure and its 
composition show statistically significant coefficients. Public expenditures contribute to increase 
the income of the rural poor modestly, while the composition of public expenditures has a larger 
effect. Altering the composition of public spending from subsidies to public goods can cause a 
                                                 
26 Both the GMM and RE coefficients associated with total government expenditures and share of non-social 
subsidies were robust to changes in the sample as well. We experimented by removing from the sample one country 
at a time and one year of data at a time. The sign and significance pattern was not affected and though the size of the 
coefficients did change, their relative sizes changed little. These regressions are available from the author on request.        
27 The estimates using poverty rate as a dependent variable are available from the author. 
28 We also tried 3 and 5 year average, but the result changed little.   23 
large increase in the income of the poor. This result is suggestive, but one should be cautious 
because the data base for this analysis is weak and the number of observations is low.           
Agricultural land expansion. One of the most negative environmental impacts of 
agriculture is its effect on deforestation. Agricultural expansion into forested areas has been 
found to be an important direct cause of deforestation, particularly in tropical countries (Pfaff, 
1999, Chomitz and Thomas, 2003).  In land-rich countries agricultural growth has been based 
more on extending the land area rather than on the intensification of production in already 
cultivated lands (Abdelgalil and Cohen, 2001; Foster, Rosenzweig, and Behrman, 2002).  The 
impact of agricultural expansion on deforestation is particularly large because of a land 
multiplier effect: According to empirical analyses, one additional permanent hectare of land 
cultivated requires clearing of between 4 and 5 hectares of forests (Chomitz and Thomas, 2003; 
López, 1997). This sizable land use multiplier is due to the fact that one additional permanent 
hectare of land cultivated needs more infrastructure and more land for human settlements, and 
the new land cultivated is often incorporated into a shifting cultivation cycle (to maintain one 
hectare under cultivation in shifting cultivation typically needs intervening at 3 to 5 hectares). 
Table 7 shows the two-way FE and RE estimates of agriculture land. We explain 
agricultural land area using agricultural GDP, non-agricultural GDP, total public expenditures in 
the rural sector, the share of government subsidies in total rural public expenditures, and the 
index of trade openness. We normalize all variables except the last two by the rural population. 
To avoid problems of simultaneous equation biases affecting the per capita agricultural GDP 
explanatory variable, we use lagged values of per capita agriculture GDP in Table 7 
(alternatively various instrumental variables were used, but the results do not dramatically 
change).  In general the coefficient estimates are quite robust to changes in specification and the 
FE and RE estimators are remarkably similar.   
Not surprising, agriculture GDP is an important determinant of the land area. The GDP 
elasticity has a value of about 0.30, which is highly significant. This relatively low value of the 
GDP elasticity suggests that agricultural growth in principle does not need to necessarily rely on 
large area expansion. There are factors other than GDP growth that are at play. Another 
important result in Table 7 is that more trade openness is a factor that contributes to intensify 
agriculture. This effect is also highly significant. This suggests that in the countries considered   24 
trade openness shifts the structure of incentives toward agricultural products that are less land-
demanding and perhaps more labor-intensive.  
The most important finding for us is, however, the strong effect that changing the 
composition of public rural expenditures can cause. In fact, according to the estimates, reducing 
the proportion of subsidies in total public expenditures from 50% to just 40% may cause, ceteris 
paribus, a reduction of agricultural land area of more than 2%, with the consequent reduction of 
the pressure imposed by agriculture on the remaining forests. As Bulte, Damania, and López 
(2004) have shown, land expansion is an important instrument to elicit subsidies from 
governments in exchange for bribes or other political contributions paid by wealthy farmers to 
government politicians. For a variety of reasons discussed by Bulte, Damania, and López, the 
ability of farmers to lobby governments and the effectiveness of such lobbying in eliciting 
subsidies is related to their land size. Therefore, excessively expanding agricultural land when 
governments are prone to subsidize the wealthy is privately rational but socially costly. The 
empirical results found give support to this hypothesis.                 
VI. Conclusion      
This paper has provided evidence suggesting that the structure of public expenditures is 
an important factor of economic development. The quantitative importance of this factor appears 
to be greater than the traditional factors on which the development literature focuses.  In 
particular, expanding total public expenditures in rural areas while maintaining the existing 
public expenditure composition prevailing in the countries does little to promote agricultural 
income and reduce rural poverty. The key issue is not so much how much money is spent in the 
sector but rather how public monies are being spent. Spending a significant share of government 
resources in non-social subsidies causes not only less agriculture income but also induces an 
excessive reliance of agricultural growth on land expansion, thus possibly exacerbating the 
negative effects of agriculture on the remaining forests.     
The econometric results provide estimates that suggest that governments over-spend in 
mostly politically motivated private goods and subsidies and under-spend in public goods and 
anti-poverty programs.  Though the very large estimated effects of expenditure composition may 
be surprising to some, one should note that these estimates are highly consistent with two 
previous pieces of evidence available in the literature.  First, the literature reports extremely large 
rates of return to many forms of public goods (often 25% to 60% per annum and above),   25 
including R&D, education, health care, some infrastructure, and certain environmental protection 
investments, and others. Also, those studies that have performed analyses over time generally 
find that the rates of return show no tendency to decline over time.  Recent surveys of this 
literature, cited earlier in the text, find an amazing degree of consensus on the estimated rates of 
return obtained in many studies that evaluate rates of return to public goods around the world.  
The fact that the studies reviewed have used different approaches and diverse data bases and 
have been applied to a large number of countries around the world means that this consensus 
should be taken seriously.  These extremely high and non-declining rates of return suggest that 
there are important investment opportunities in public goods that are not being fully exploited. 
That is, it suggests under-spending in public goods.   
Second, many firm-level studies around the world (some cited earlier in the text) have 
found that subsidies aimed at promoting investment, employment, and growth do not achieve 
these objectives. In some cases they are counterproductive to these goals. Thus, while the rates of 
return to public goods are very high, the rates of return to private goods or subsidies are very low 
or even negative. Yet governments tend to spend a large share of their resources on the goods 
that have low returns while at the same time foregoing investments with very large rates of 
return. Switching spending priorities can obtain massive dividends.    26 
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TABLE 1 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN THE RURAL SECTOR: ANNUAL COUNTRY AVERAGES, 1985–2000 
(MILLIONS US$ OF 2000) 
 
Countries  Subsidies 






 Public Goods 










174.6  65.4  92.2  34.6  266.8 
Honduras  3.3  10.8  27.6  89.2  31.0 
Panama  82.9  80.8  19.6  19.2  102.5 
Paraguay  106.5  86.5  16.6  13.5  123.1 
Peru  197.3  55.0  161.4  45.0  358.7 
Venezuela  283.8  54.2  239.9  45.8  523.8 
Ecuador  89.8  67.3  43.61  32.7  133.4 









   30 
 Table 2 
 
DETERMINANTS OF LONG-RUN PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL GDP. DEPENDENT 





Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
Log of average annual public 

















Log of (predicted) non-
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TABLE 3 
 ESTIMATING PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL GDP USING ANNUAL DATA WITH ANNUAL DUMMIES. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG OF PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL GDP 
 
Panel Regression  Variables 
Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
Log of total per capita public 





Share of expenditures on non-social 



















































































Number of observations: 133;  Number of countries (groups): 10   32 
TABLE 4 
DYNAMIC ARELLANO-BOND GMM ESTIMATES OF PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL GDP. DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE: LOG OF PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL GDP 
 








Log of total per capita public expenditures 





Share of expenditures on non-social 





















D87    -0.034 
(0.053) 
D88    0.042*** 
(0.019) 
D89    0.002 
(0.028) 
D90    -0.014 
(0.031) 
D91    0.012 
(0.026) 
D92    -0.004 
(0.038) 
D93    -0.016 
(0.037) 
D94    0.005 
(0.034) 
D95    0.022 
(0.026) 
D96    0.026 
(0.025) 
D97    0.004 
(0.017) 
D98    0.004 
(0.023) 
D99    0.007 
(0.020) 
Arellano-Bond test autocovariance in 
residuals of order 2 
1.82**  1.96*** 
Notes: *** 5%, ** 10%, level of significance. Number of observations: 129; Number of countries (groups): 10. All 
standard errors are robust.   33 
Table 5 
ESTIMATING AGRICULTURAL GDP NORMALIZED BY LAND AREA, 1985–2000. 
Panel Regression  Variables  Generalized Method of 
Moments  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
Lag of agricultural GDP per hectare  0.522*** 
(0.099) 
   
Log of total public expenditures in rural 























































































































Arellano-Bond test autocovariance in 
residuals of order 2  0.99 
   
Note: ***-5% level of significance; ** - 10% level of significance. Number of observations: 133; Number 
of countries: 10.   34 
 
TABLE 6 
ESTIMATING THE DETERMINANTS OF PER CAPITA INCOME OF RURAL POOR, 1990–2002*. 





Fixed Effects  Random Effects  
Log of average annual public 
expenditures per capita in the rural 




Share of non-social subsidies in 
public expenditures in the rural 










Log of lagged non-agricultural 










Number of countries  12  12 
Adj R-Sq  0.742  0.6208 
# Observations  34  34 
Hausman test Chi square    0.056 
 
Note: * Using 5 year lagged averages for all variables but for the dependent variable. All 
standard errors are heteroskedastic consistent. ***-5% level of significance;    35 
Table 7. 
ESTIMATING THE DETERMINANTS OF AGRICULTURAL LAND AREA FOR TEN 
COUNTRIES, 1985–2000. 
 
Panel Regression  Variable 
Fixed Effects  Random Effects  




Log of average annual public 





Share of non-social subsidies in public 


























































































Adj R-Sq  0.999  0.696 
Note: All standard errors are heteroskedastic consistent. ***5% level of significance; **10% 
level of significance; * 15% level of significance. There are 10 countries and 153 observations.   36 
Appendix 
 
Summary Statistics of Selected Variables Used in the Regressions 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Share of non-social subsidies in public 
expenditures in the rural sector  0.477  0.264  0.030  0.920 
Index of trade openness  -16.698  21.343  -63.210  55.452 
Agricultural GDP per capita in 000s 
2000 dollars   0.844  1.487  0.220  7.144 
Log of agricultural GDP per capita  -0.170  0.789  -1.514  1.966 
Total per capita public expenditures in 
the rural sector in 000s dollars  0.060  0.065  0.000  0.412 
Log of total per capita public 
expenditures in the rural sector   -3.868  2.264  -10.820  -0.886 
Non-social subsidies per capita in 
0000s dollars  0.033  0.038  0.001  0.228 
Log of non-social subsidies per capita  -4.859  2.541  -11.513  -1.479 
Public goods expenditure per capita in 
000s dollars  0.027  0.034  0.001  0.184 
Log of public goods expenditure per 
capita  -4.668  2.212  -11.513  -1.691 
Land area in agriculture per capita in 
000s of hectares  0.008  0.014  0.001  0.055 
Log of land area in agriculture per 
capita  -5.757  1.260  -7.808  -2.898 
Non-agricultural GDP per capita in 
000s of dollars  1.270  1.821  0.112  8.172 
Log of non-agricultural GDP per 
capita  0.207  0.109  -2.189  2.100 
 
 